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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




                Appellant
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY
_____________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 06-cv-00296)
District Judge: Honorable William J. Martini
________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 3, 2007
Before:  RENDELL, COWEN AND VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
 (Filed February 2, 2007)
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
PER CURIAM
This is an appeal from the District Court’s dismissal of Joseph Aruanno’s
complaint without prejudice.  Aruanno filed his complaint pro se.  The District Court
granted him in forma pauperis status.  We will vacate the District Court’s order and
remand for further proceedings.  
    1  Pro se complaints are liberally construed.  See Holley v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs,
165 F.3d 244, 247 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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I.
Aruanno raised his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  He alleged that
the procedures in place for his civil commitment hearing violated his due process rights.1 
He requested a new civil commitment hearing.
Before the complaint was served, the District Court screened the complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.  The District Court determined that Aruanno’s sole
federal remedy was a writ of habeas corpus.  Furthermore, the District Court determined
that to the extent that Aruanno sought declaratory or injunctive relief, his claims had not
yet accrued because a favorable judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of his
civil commitment.  Thus, the District Court dismissed Aruanno’s complaint without
prejudice.  Aruanno timely filed a notice of appeal.  
II.
The basis for our appellate jurisdiction is slightly (although not fatally)
complicated by the dismissal of the proceedings below without prejudice.  Orders without
prejudice are generally not final within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See
Umbenhauer v. Woog, 969 F.2d 25, 30 n.6 (3d Cir. 1992).  In this case, however, the
District Court divested itself of the suit completely.  Therefore, we have appellate
jurisdiction.  See Erie County Retirees Ass’n v. County of Erie, Pa., 220 F.3d 193, 202
(3d Cir. 2000)(citations omitted).  
3Our review of the District Court’s dismissal of the complaint is plenary. 
We must accept all factual allegations of the complaint as true and all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from them.  See Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir.
1996).  
III.
A prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge the fact
or duration of his confinement.  See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005).  “He
must seek federal habeas corpus relief (or appropriate state relief) instead.”  Id.  A § 1983
action is barred if a plaintiff’s success in the action would necessarily demonstrate the
invalidity of the confinement or its duration.  See id. at 81-82.  In Wilkinson, the plaintiffs
sought relief that would render the state procedures used to deny parole eligibility and
parole suitability invalid.  See id. at 82.  The Supreme Court determined that the
plaintiffs’ claims in Wilkinson were cognizable under § 1983 because success would not
mean that the plaintiffs would be immediately released or have a shorter confinement. 
See id.  Rather, success would only mean a new parole eligibility review or a new parole
hearing.  See id.  Thus, their claims did not lie “at the core of habeas corpus.”  Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
Similar to the claims in Wilkinson, Aruanno’s claims do not lie “at the core
of habeas corpus.”  Aruanno seeks relief that would render the state’s procedures in civil
    2 For example, Aruanno argues that his due process rights were violated because a jury
did not decide his civil commitment.   
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commitment hearings invalid.2  Aruanno does not seek immediate release from civil
commitment or a shorter civil commitment period.  Instead, he only seeks a new civil
commitment hearing.  Pursuant to Wilkinson, Aruanno’s claims are cognizable under
§ 1983.  
IV.
In conclusion, we find that Aruanno’s complaint does not “lie at the core of
habeas corpus” and that his claims are cognizable under § 1983.  Accordingly, we will
vacate the District Court’s order and remand for further proceedings.  Aruanno’s motion
for reconsideration of this Court’s denial of his motion to appoint counsel is denied.   
